# 1NC v Harvard Amherst

## OFF

### Topicality---1NC

#### The resolution should define the division of ground. It was negotiated and announced in advance providing both teams a reasonable opportunity to prepare. Only a textual reading of the resolution provides a predictable basis for research.

#### USFG means the three branches.

OECD 87. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The Control and Management of Government Expenditure. 179. Google Book.

1. Political and organizational structure of government The United States America is a federal republic consisting of 50 states. States have their own constitutions and within each State there are at least two additional levels of government, generally designated as counties and cities, towns or villages. The relationships between different levels of government are complex and varied (see Section B for more information). The Federal Government is composed of three branches: the legislative branch, the executive branch, and the judicial branch. Budgetary decisionmaking is shared primarily by the legislative and executive branches. The general structure of these two branches relative to budget formulation and execution is as follows.

#### ‘Resolved’ means to enact a policy by law.

Words and Phrases 64. Permanent Edition. Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### Vote negative:

#### 1. Clash: debate requires a predictable topic to motivate in depth research that yields the values of negation and argument refinement. Their interp explodes limits, allows affirmative conditionality, and makes debate a one-sided monologue devoid of argumentation which turns the case.

#### 2. Competition: the neg should win on average 50% of the time. Entering a competitive activity proves their arguments are shaped by a drive to win. The insurmountable advantage of being affirmative under their unfair model is a reason they should lose.

### Afro-Pess - 1NC

#### Civil societies attempt to make gains based on empirical improvement are antiblack---Slavery is constitutive of civic institutions and blackness functions as the anti-Human to cohere life.

**Wilderson 10** Frank B. Wilderson, Red, White, & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms

Regarding the Black position, some might ask why, after claims successfully made on the state by the Civil Rights Movement, do I insist on positing an operational analytic for cinema, film studies, and political theory that appears to be a dichotomous and essentialist pairing of Masters and Slaves? In other words, why should we think of today’s Blacks in the US as Slaves and everyone else (with the exception of Indians) as Masters? One could answer these questions by demonstrating how nothing remotely approaching claims successfully made on the State has come to pass. In other words, the election of a Black President aside, **police brutality, mass incarceration, segregated and substandard schools and housing, astronomical rates of HIV infection, and the threat of being turned away en masse at the polls still constitute the lived experience of Black life**. **But such empirically based rejoinders would lead us in the wrong direction; we would find ourselves on “solid” ground, which would** only **mystify**, rather than clarify, **the question**. We would be forced to appeal to “facts,” the “historical record,” and empirical markers of stasis and change, **all of which could be turned on their head with more of the same**. Underlying such a downward spiral into sociology, political science, history, and/or public policy debates **would be the very rubric that I am calling into question**: the grammar of suffering known as exploitation and alienation, the assumptive logic whereby subjective dispossession is arrived at in the calculations between those who sell labor power and those who acquire it. The Black qua the worker. Orlando Patterson has already dispelled this faulty ontological grammar in Slavery and Social Death, where he demonstrates how and why work, or forced **labor, is not a constituent element of slavery**. Once the “solid” plank of “work” is removed from slavery, then the conceptually coherent notion of “claims against the state”—the proposition that the state and civil society are elastic enough to even contemplate the possibility of an emancipatory project for the Black position—disintegrates into thin air. The imaginary of the state and civil society is parasitic on the Middle Passage. Put another way: no slave, no world. And, in addition, as Patterson argues, **no slave is in the world**.

If, as an ontological position, that is, as a grammar of suffering, the Slave is not a laborer but an anti-Human, **a positionality against which Humanity establishes, maintains, and renews it coherence**, its corporeal integrity; if the Slave is, to borrow from Patterson, generally **dishonored, perpetually open to gratuitous violence, and void of kinship structure**, that is, having no relations that need be recognized, a being outside of relationality, then **our analysis cannot be approached through the rubric of gains or reversals in struggles** with the state and civil society, not unless and until the interlocutor first explains how the Slave is of the world. **The onus is** not on one who posits the Master/Slave dichotomy, but **on the one who argues there is a distinction** between Slaveness and Blackness. How, when, and where did such a split occur? The woman at the gates of Columbia University awaits an answer.

#### Fixing debate makes radical critique impossible---they assume racism as ignorance which subordinate antiblackness

**Martinot and Sexton 03** “The Avant-garde of White Supremacy” http://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~marto/avantguard.htm

**Leftist approaches that come** as **close to radical critique** as any **already fall short**. The liberal ethos looks at racism as ignorance, something characteristic of the individual that can be solved at a social level through education and democratic procedure. For Marxist thought, racism is a divide-and-conquer strategy for class rule and super-exploitation. However, the idea that it is a strategy assumes that it can be counter-strategized at some kind of local or individual level rather than existing as something fundamental to class relations themselves. For anti-colonialist thinking, racism is a social ideology that can be refuted, a structure of privilege to be given up, again at the local or individual level. Where **liberalism subordinates** the issue of **racism to the presumed potentialities of individual development, Marxism subordinates** the issue of **race** to class relations of struggle, **and anti-colonial** radicalism **pretends its mere existence** as a "movement" **is the first step toward eradicating racism**. But liberalism’s social democracy pretends that state oligarchy is really interested in justice. And the more radical critiques subsume the issue of racism in promises of future transformations of the power relations to which de-racialization is deferred.

This stumbling back and forth between the individual and the social is even reflected in the social scientific literature on race and racism. Most theorizing proceeds by either psychologizing intricate political and historical processes, or by socializing questions of subjectivity and agency. The psychologizing approach primarily attributes the project of white supremacy to the lurid preoccupations of (white) individual or collective psychic or biological pathologies. The socializing approach reduces white supremacy to ‘mere’ racism, a subsidiary strategy for the maintenance of social, political, and economic power by the (white) ruling class. Whereas the former locates the genesis of racism in (projected) fear and anxiety, insecurity or (repressed) desire, the latter claims that the specific pronouncements and practices of white supremacy are ideological subterfuge, rationalizations for or tactics of the political economy. For the first, **remedies can always be found within liberal capitalism**: from psychological counseling, moral and scientific education, legal prohibition, or even gene therapy to the self-righteous championing of human rights in nations as far away as possible. For the second, it is assumed that if racism can made not useful to the relations of production or the security of territorial boundaries, it will fade from the social landscape like the proverbial withering away of the state. In either case, **what needs to be wrenched from the grasp of white supremacy is left entirely out of the account in the name of the epiphenomenal or the overdetermining**.

In both arenas a hidden depth, a secret drive, an unfathomed animus is postulated and a procedure derived that will plumb that depth, excavate the problem, dredge out the muck that causes these aberrant behaviors that we call racism. And in both approaches an issue is skirted. It is as if there were something at the center of white supremacy that is too adamantine, off of which the utmost of western analytic thought slides helplessly toward the simplistic, the personal or the institutional. **The supposed secrets of white supremacy get sleuthed in its spectacular displays**, in pathology and instrumentality, **or pawned off on the figure of the "rogue cop." Each approach to race subordinates it to** something that is **not race**, as if to continue the noble epistemological endeavor of getting to know it better. But what each ends up talking about is that other thing. **In the face of this, the left’s anti-racism becomes its passion**. But its passion gives it away. **It signifies the passive acceptance of the idea that race**, considered to be either a real property of a person or an imaginary projection, **is not essential to the social structure**, a system of social meanings and categorizations. **It is the same passive apparatus of whiteness that in its mainstream guise actively forgets that it owes its existence to the killing and terrorizing of those it racializes for the purpose, expelling them from the human fold in the same gesture of forgetting**. It is the passivity of bad faith that tacitly accepts as "what goes without saying" the postulates of white supremacy. And it must do so passionately since "what goes without saying" is empty and can be held as a "truth" only through an obsessiveness. The truth is that the truth is on the surface, flat and repetitive, just as the law is made by the uniform.

#### Unless they challenge their underlying epistemology, you should vote negative – all the violence is just recreated. Voting negative is an act of claiming the entire system of thought must be broken

**Gorelick 08** [Nathan Gorelick is a Ph.D. student of Comparative Literature at the State University of New York at Buffalo, where he holds a Presidential Fellowship. His research concerns theories of excess from Blanchot, Bataille and Foucault, and these thinkers' indebtedness to 18th century literatures of death and sexuality in England and France.] “Imagining Extraordinary Renditions: Terror, Torture and the Possibility of an Excessive Ethics in Literature” http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory\_and\_event/v011/11.2.gorelick.html

III. Literature Beyond Ethics

Extraordinary rendition, torture, the war on terror and the security of the state are thus various nodal points within the larger epistemology of liberal humanism -- a humanism that produces its dark chambers in its flight from the black void at its own core. Césaire's "thingification" is the product of this flight. It would therefore be misguided to assume that the violence endemic to the war on terror can be cured by simply exposing its contradictions. If images from Abu Ghraib become a common rallying cry against American militarism for disparate political factions around the globe, this cry is unheeded. If legal challenges to abominable state violence are successful, inventive re-interpretations of the law emerge, or lawlessness is simply driven underground. Instead, it is necessary to challenge the systems of thought from which these practices emerge; the task of criticism must be to interrupt the epistemology of the burrow.

The dark chamber (extraordinary rendition) ought to be understood as a metaphor for this epistemology, and ethical criticism must expose the totality of violence that this metaphor represents without enabling morally totalizing recuperations of the larger world ordering project currently embodied and deployed by the United States. Such a project entails a reconfiguration of the political terrain, or a reconstitution of the limits of political antagonism, but it also implies the need for an even more profound challenge to the ways in which discourses and representations of "self" and "other" are constituted. The task is not simple: as Michael J. Shapiro suggests, "Recognition of the extraordinary lengths to which one must go to challenge a given structure of intelligibility, to intervene in resident meanings by bringing what is silent and unglimpsed into focus, is an essential step toward opening up possibilities for a politics and ethics of discourse."45 If, however, an ethical regard is rendered possible through the work of rigorous critique -- through the establishment of a critical distance between the critic and the object of criticism then the question for critique concerns the very nature of the ethical itself.

Because the crisis in representation by which the dark chamber is constantly being suppressed is constitutive of politics as such, then the problem, as Coetzee reminds us, is "how not to play the game by the rules of the state, how to establish one's own authority, how to imagine torture and death on one's own terms."46 Coetzee's suggestion that torture and death might be "imagined" implies that an effective intervention should not adopt a strategy of representational verisimilitude -- the goal should not be to take and disseminate photographs of Uzbek or Russian torture chambers, or to produce comprehensive, anatomical descriptions of horrendous state-sanctioned violence. Such efforts risk a different kind of satisfaction than that which is demonstrated by a smiling prison guard at Abu Ghraib, a voyeuristic pleasure in consuming images of a suffering other and a dangerous appropriation of that suffering as something to be easily understood and made one's own. The image thus commodified, its subject's pain is reduced to a political bargaining chip, a source for aesthetic elaboration, a sensational news item; the singularly unrepresentable experience of torture -- the reason for which it is inexcusable -- is polluted by its representation.

So, it is necessary to expose and criticize torture, but the brutality of the experience must somehow be represented in its unrepresentability. A criticism in search of ethical possibilities, in whatever form, must find ways to avoid "either looking on in horrified fascination as the blows fall or turning one's eyes away."47 It must situate itself at the level of epistemology, **rather than fixating on singular eruptions of violence** and state brutality**.** Otherwise, critique is already "play[ing] the game by the rules of the state," operating within the dialectic of visibility endemic to the epistemology of the burrow.

#### Re-creating hope in an anti-black system reifies systematic exclusion and causes resentment

**Warren 15** – prof @ George Washington University (Calvin, “Black Nihilism and the Politics of Hope,” The New Centennial Review, Vol. 15, No. 1, Derrida and French Hegelianism (Spring 2015), pp. 220-221)

This brilliant analysis compels us to rethink political rationality and the value in “means”—as a structuring agent by itself. What I would like to think through, however, is the distinction between “hope” and “despair” and “expectations” and “object.” Whereas Farred understands political participation as an act without a political object, or recognizable outcome—without an “end,” if we think of “end” and “object” as synonyms—I would suggest that the Politics of Hope reconfigures despair and expectation **so that black political action pursues an impossible object**. We can describe this contradictory object as the lure of metaphysical political activity: every act brings one closer to a “not-yet-social order.” What one achieves, then, and expects is “closer.” The political object that black participation **encircles endlessly**, like the Lacanian drive and its object, **is** the idea of linear proximity—we can call this “**progress**,” “betterment,” or “more perfect.” This idea of achieving the impossible **allows one to disregard the historicity of anti-blackness and its continued legacy** and conceive of political engagement as bringing one incrementally closer to that which does not exist—one’s impossible object. In this way, **the Politics of hope recasts despair as possibility, struggle as triumph, and lack as propinquity**. This impossible object is not tethered to real history, so it is unassailable and irrefutable because **it is the object of political fantasy**.

The politics of **hope**, then, **constitutes** what Lauren Berlant would call “**cruel optimism**” for blacks (Berlant 2011). It bundles certain promises about redress, equality, freedom, justice, and progress into a political object that always lies beyond reach. **The objective of the Political is to keep blacks in** a **relation to this** political **object**—in an unending pursuit of it. **This pursuit**, however, is detrimental because it **strengthens the very anti-black system that would pulverize black being**. The pursuit of the object certainly has an “irrational” aspect to it, as Farred details, but it is not mere means without expectation; instead, it is a means that undermines the attainment of the impossible object desired. In other words, the pursuit marks a cruel attachment to the means of subjugation and the continued widening of the gap between historical reality and fantastical ideal.

#### The impact is structural, objective vertigo, which paradigmatically outweighs the affs subjective vertigo impacts

**Wilderson 11** (Frank, PhD, Associate Professor, African American Studies Dept., UC Irvine, “The Vengeance of Vertigo: Aphasia and Abjection in the Political Trials of Black Insurgents”, InTensions, Vol 5, 2011) http://www.yorku.ca/intent/issue5/articles/pdfs/frankbwildersoniiiarticle.pdf

[3] Subjective vertigo is vertigo of the event. But the sensation that one is not simply spinning in an otherwise stable environment, that one’s environment is perpetually unhinged stems from a relationship to violence that cannot be analogized. This is called objective vertigo, a life constituted by disorientation rather than a life interrupted by disorientation. **This is structural** as opposed to performative violence. Black subjectivity is a crossroads **where vertigoes meet**, the intersection of performative and structural violence.

[4] Elsewhere I have argued that the Black is a sentient being though not a Human being. The Black’s and the Human’s disparate relationship to violence is at the heart of this failure of incorporation and analogy. The Human suffers contingent violence, violence that kicks in when s/he resists (or is perceived to resist) the disciplinary discourse of capital and/or Oedipus. But Black peoples’ subsumption by violence is a **paradigmatic necessity, not just a performative contingency**. To be constituted by and disciplined by violence, to be gripped simultaneously by **subjective and objective vertigo**, is indicative of a political ontology which is radically different from the political ontology of a sentient being who is constituted by discourse and disciplined by violence when s/he breaks with the ruling discursive codes. vi When we begin to assess revolutionary armed struggle in this comparative context, we find that Human revolutionaries (workers, women, gays and lesbians, post-colonial subjects) **suffer subjective vertigo** when they meet the state’s disciplinary violence with the revolutionary violence of the subaltern; **but they are spared objective vertigo**. This is because the most disorienting aspects of their lives are induced by the struggles that arise from intra-Human conflicts over competing conceptual frameworks and disputed cognitive maps, such as the American Indian Movement’s demand for the return of Turtle Island vs. the U.S.’s desire to maintain territorial integrity, or the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional’s (FALN) demand for Puerto Rican independence vs. the U.S.’s desire to maintain Puerto Rico as a territory. **But for the Black, as for the slave, there are** no cognitive maps, **no conceptual frameworks of suffering and dispossession which are analogic with the myriad maps and frameworks which explain the dispossession of Human subalterns**.

#### The alt is to end the world. Their question of what the alternative does is always already anti-black. The alternative is not to do, but to dream of undoing –what to be done always begs the question of what a non-being – the slave – can do. Thinking that actions can solve mystifies the world, thus renewing the liberal dream of redemption

**Wilderson 10** Frank B. Wilderson, Red, White, & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms

It is customary for a book like this to end with a prescriptive gesture, at least the germ of a new beginning if not a new world, a seed to be nurtured and cultivated by Lenin’s question, What is to be done? Even when such seeds were not sown throughout the book, an author might be tempted to harvest a yield, however meager, in the conclusion. Not only have such seeds not been sown in this book, but I have argued that **anti-Blackness is the genome of this horticultural template for Human renewal**. Given the structural violence that it takes to produce and reproduce a Slave—violence as the structure of Black life, as opposed to violence as one of many lived Black experiences—a concluding consideration of the question, **What is to be done? would ring hollow**.

Fanon came closest to the only image of sowing and harvesting that befits this book. Quoting Cesaire, he urged his readers to start “the **end of the world**,” the “**only thing**… worth the effort of starting” (Black Skin, White Masks 96), a shift from horticulture to pyrotechnics. Rather than mime the restoration and/or reorganization dreams which conclusions often fall prey to, however unwittingly, Fanon dreams of an undoing, **however implausible, for its own sake**. Still, there are moments when Fanon finds his own flames to be too incendiary. So much so that he momentarily backs away from the comprehensive emancipation he calls for. Which is why one can find the Fanon of the Slave on the same page as the Fanon of the postcolonial subject. Nonetheless, I am humbled by his efforts; and though I am freighted with enough hubris to extend his ensemble of questions beyond his unintentional containment strategies, I know better than to underrate their gravitas by deigning to offer—or even hint at—a roadmap to freedom so extensive it would free us from the epistemic air we breathe. To say we must be free of air, while admitting to knowledge of no other source of breath, is what I have tried to do here.

In the preceding chapters I have critiqued Marxism, White feminism, and Indigenism by arguing that their approach to the question, What is to be thought? and to its doppelgänger, What is to be done? **advances through misrecognition of the Slave, a sentient being that cannot be**. The way Marxism, White feminism, and Indigenism approach the problem of the paradigm, in other words, their account of unethical power relations, emerges as a constituent element of those relations. Through their indisputably robust interventions, the world they seek to clarify and deconstruct is the world they ultimately mystify and renew.

## Case

### Debate Presumption---2NC

#### You can entirely agree with the idea that debate should change participation but it’s not a reason why we should lose.

#### 1. Harvard Amherst winning Zoom Room Round 1 doesn’t change “hybrid fungibility.” All teams will see is a win or a loss on tabroom which doesn’t mobilize change. Action to change community initiatives requires action with NDT and CEDA committees.

#### 2. Their method of debate links to a competition turn that magnifies our offense. The nature of debate requires the neg to disagree which creates a moral hazard where we’re forced to negate the value of the 1AC or weaponize strategies against the students---intensifies psychic burnout.

#### Individual rounds don’t change the community but creating community change through rounds in an activity that forces competition fractures coalitions and unity.

Atchison and Panetta 9. Jarrod, Director of Debate – Wake Forest University, Edward Panetta, Director of Debate – University of Georgia, “Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication: Issues for the Future”, 2009, Sage Handbook of Rhetorical Studies, pg. 317-334

The final problem with an individual debate round focus is the role of competition. Creating community change through individual debate rounds sacrifices the “community” portion of the change. Many teams that promote activist strategies in debates profess that they are more interested in creating change than winning debates. What is clear, however, is that the vast majority of teams that are not promoting community change are very interested in winning debates. The tension that is generated from the clash of these opposing forces is tremendous. Unfortunately, this is rarely a productive tension. Forcing teams to consider their purpose in debating, their style in debates, and their approach to evidence are all critical aspects of being participants in the community. However, the dismissal of the proposed resolution that the debaters have spent countless hours preparing for, in the name of a community problem that the debaters often have little control over, does little to engender coalitions of the willing. Should a debate team lose because their director or coach has been ineffective at recruiting minority participants? Should a debate team lose because their coach or director holds political positions that are in opposition to the activist program? Competition has been a critical component of the interest in intercollegiate debate from the beginning, and it does not help further the goals of the debate community to dismiss competition in the name of community change. The larger problem with locating the “debate as activism” perspective within the competitive framework is that it overlooks the communal nature of the community problem. If each individual debate is a decision about how the debate community should approach a problem, then the losing debaters become collateral damage in the activist strategy dedicated toward creating community change. One frustrating example of this type of argument might include a judge voting for an activist team in an effort to help them reach elimination rounds to generate a community discussion about the problem. Under this scenario, the losing team serves as a sacrificial lamb on the altar of community change. Downplaying the important role of competition and treating opponents as scapegoats for the failures of the community may increase the profile of the winning team and the community problem, but it does little to generate the critical coalitions necessary to address the community problem, because the competitive focus encourages teams to concentrate on **how to beat the strategy** with **little regard** for addressing the community problem. There is no role for competition when a judge decides that it is important to accentuate the publicity of a community problem. An extreme example might include a team arguing that their opponents’ academic institution had a legacy of civil rights abuses and that the judge should not vote for them because that would be a community endorsement of a problematic institution. This scenario is a bit more outlandish but not unreasonable if one assumes that each debate should be about what is best for promoting solutions to diversity problems in the debate community. If the debate community is serious about generating community change, then it is more likely to occur **outside** a traditional competitive debate. When a team loses a debate because the judge decides that it is better for the community for the other team to win, then they have sacrificed two potential advocates for change within the community. Creating change through wins generates **backlash** through losses. Some proponents are comfortable with generating backlash and argue that the reaction is evidence that the issue is being discussed. From our perspective, the discussion that results from these hostile situations is not a productive one where participants seek to work together for a common goal. Instead of giving up on hope for change and agitating for wins regardless of who is left behind, it seems more reasonable that the debate community should try the method of public argument that we teach in an effort to generate a discussion of necessary community changes. Simply put, debate competitions do not represent the best environment for community change because it is a competition for a win and only one team can win any given debate, whereas addressing systemic century-long community problems requires a tremendous effort by a great number of people.

#### 3. Ballots as validating are bad.

Karlberg 3 (Michael, Assistant Professor of Communication at Western Washington University, PEACE & CHANGE, v28, n3, July, p. 339-41)

Granted, social activists do "win" occasional “battles” in these adversarial arenas, but the root causes of their concerns largely remain unaddressed and the larger "wars" arguably are not going well. Consider the case of environmental activism. Countless environmental protests, lobbies, and lawsuits mounted in recent generations throughout the Western world. Many small victories have been won. Yet environmental degradation continues to accelerate at a rate that far outpaces the highly circumscribed advances made in these limited battles the most committed environmentalists acknowledge things are not going well. In addition, adversarial strategies of social change embody assumptions that have internal consequences for social movements, such as internal factionalization. For instance, virtually all of the social projects of the "left” throughout the 20th century have suffered from recurrent internal factionalization. The opening decades of the century were marked by political infighting among vanguard communist revolutionaries. The middle decades of the century were marked by theoretical disputes among leftist intellectuals. The century's closing decades have been marked by the fracturing of the a new left\*\* under the centrifugal pressures of identity politics. Underlying this pattern of infighting and factionalization is the tendency to interpret differences—of class, race, gender, perspective, or strategy—as sources of antagonism and conflict. In this regard, the political "left" and "right" both define themselves in terms at a common adversary—the "other"—defined by political differences. Not surprisingly, advocates of both the left and right frequently invoke the need for internal unity in order to prevail over their adversaries on the other side of the alleged political spectrum. However, because the terms left and right axe both artificial and reified categories that do not reflect the complexity of actual social relations, values, or beliefs, there is no way to achieve lasting unity within either camp because there are no actual boundaries between them. In reality, social relations, values, and beliefs are infinitely complex and variable. Yet once an adversarial posture is adopted by assuming that differences are sources at conflict, initial distinctions between the left and the right inevitably are followed by subsequent distinctions within the left and the right. Once this centrifugal process is set in motion, it is difficult, if not impossible, to restrain. For all of these reasons, adversarial strategies have reached a point of diminishing returns even if such strategies were necessary and viable in the past when human populations were less socially and ecologically interdependent those conditions no longer exist. Our reproductive and technological success as a species has led to conditions of unprecedented interdependence, and no group on the planet is isolated any longer. Under these new conditions, new strategies not only are possible but are essential. Humanity has become a single interdependent social body. In order to meet the complex social and environmental challenges now facng us, we must learn to coordinate our collective actions. Yet a body cannot coordinate its actions as long as its "left" and is "right," or its "north" and its "south," or its "east" and its "west" are locked in adversarial relationships.

### Turn---1NC

#### Their description of policy debate as anti-competitive and turns the case. It reinforces corporatization of education and normalizes inequitable power structures.

Kip Austin Hinton 15, Assistant Professor, The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley, “Should We Use a Capital Framework to Understand Culture? Applying Cultural Capital to Communities of Color,” Equity & Excellence in Education, 48(2), 299-319, 2015.

Influence of an Economic Metaphor on Communities of Color

It makes sense for a neoliberal economist to embrace the prism of social or cultural capital, because economic research frequently interprets the world as a primarily economic sphere. But what about when a social justice educator embraces social or cultural capital? Many social justice advocates do not define the world in economic terms, and do not see market forces as the primary solution to oppressive systems. Capitalism promotes hegemony, not social justice. The agenda of capital has always run counter to the goals of community empowerment: “Within this transformed system, capital demanded that the household function as a factory” (Perelman, 2000, p. 74). According to Weber, the mere existence of family relationships presents an obstacle to capitalism (Collins, 1986, p. 269). Decades ago, Apple (1971) warned that schools were slipping into a marketplace orientation, prioritizing “maintenance of the same dominant world-view” (p. 27). Public institutions have indeed become more market-driven, focused on capital in a way that disempowers communities of color, making it harder to enact democratic reforms (Apple, 2006; Clawson & Leiblum, 2008). Metaphorical capital does not contribute to this directly, but rather indirectly—through metaphor.

Across metaphorical capitals, each framework is fundamentally economic. Research on funds of knowledge and community cultural wealth mimic economic vocabulary without a conception of investment or of supply and demand. Looking to the source, Bourdieu’s (1977) prominent theories are influenced by the economic work of Marx (2011). This makes it particularly notable that Bourdieu himself ignores most aspects of economic capital when he applies it to cultural interaction. Bourdieu does not theorize systems of exchange, return on investment, loans, entrepreneurship, or the actions of cultural capitalists. In fact, Bourdieu’s original concept is somewhat analogous to money, not to capital. Successive theorists have been reluctant to move beyond Bourdieu’s initial, imprecise articulations (Dika & Singh, 2002; Lin, 1999). So, although it may be unusual to come across a theory of race that ignores racism, it is common for a theory of capital to ignore capitalism.

Metaphors have influence. In a metaphor, one domain of human thought is superimposed on a different domain, creating important influence on the receiving domain (Barcelona, 2003). Lakoff (2004) and others have explained how a repeated metaphor reifies in our consciousness, even altering neural processes (Kovecses, 2010). The way any issue is framed, writes Mehta (2013), ¨ “changes the nature of the debate” (p. 292). A problem’s definition is a political consideration, deeply influencing which questions we ask, and which solutions we consider (Lakoff & Pinker, 2007; Sandikcioglu, 2003). This is illustrated by prominent metaphors in the languages of industrialized nations. We use money metaphors to think about time (spend time, living on borrowed time); we use war metaphors to think about arguments (defend a position, surrender a point). As Lakoff and Johnson (2003) explain, we do not explain arguments using a dance metaphor (p. 5), but if we did, it would influence the way we see our opponents/partners.

In the case of culture, are there limits to what education researchers are willing to characterize as capital? Derrida and Moore (1974) warn us of “deploying” metaphors “without limit”: “Consequently the reassuring dichotomy between the metaphorical and the proper is exploded” (p. 74). S. Smith and Kulynych (2002) claim social capital confuses analytical categories because capital is inextricably tied to economic discourse; this critique applies to all forms of metaphorical capital. In public consciousness, capital will not be divorced from capitalism. Deployments of metaphorical capital, therefore, impose the economic worldview of capitalism. These theories position capital and wealth as the normal ways of defining a relationship. Even if such theories were revised to reflect money instead (e.g., “cultural currency”), they would still precariously assume that human interaction can and should be explained in economic terms.

Metaphorical capital advances an economic framework that interprets educational or cultural situations as capitalist, neoliberal, and market-based. We have adopted a specific paradigm, and now that paradigm dictates policy options (P. Hall, 1993). Neoliberal solutions, including standardized testing and charter schools, already dominate education reform (Jones & Vagle, 2013). Political and social critiques are central to critical race theory—yet are marginalized by neoliberal discourse. It is significant that Friedman (1997), one of the most influential proponents of capital and capitalism, advocated privatization of all public schools through vouchers. Rather than functioning as independent fields, education and economics are deeply connected, often in destructive ways. In the past decades, education research has seen an increase in both capitalrelated social theory and the influence of economics. Privatization and corporatization have increased throughout education systems (Saltman, 2012). Aside from the direct harm caused by market-based reform (Burch, 2009; Saltman, 2000), corporatization has reinforced the economic worldview that was embodied by metaphorical capital. Education reports are filled with finance-related vocabulary: funds, investment, value-added, stakeholder, productivity, buy-in. Economic perspectives infringe on discussions about students, even when topics are ostensibly unrelated to money. “This is the extent of capitalism’s hegemony, that it has colonized our capacity to imagine alternatives” (Hickel & Khan, 2012, p. 221). Language influences thought, and educators begin to accept the market mindset. We normalize an inequitable power structure. The capitalist viewpoint becomes the normal way to see everything, and its opportunistic oppression, likewise, becomes normal. It is not surprising, then, that the assets of communities of color go unrecognized—and as I write this, I struggle to explain the limitations of a capitalist frame without reproducing that frame, with my problematic word choice, “assets.”

Freire (1970) has been influential among scholars who rely on metaphorical capital to write about students of color. It is significant that Freire employs economic metaphors to represent the problem (Oughton, 2010): “Banking education” is his name for the method that dehumanizes students (Freire, 1970, p. 73). Freire recognizes economic power as a destructive force at play in the lives of the poor. He consistently opposes multiple elements of the neoliberal agenda, especially the prioritization of capital (Carnoy, 1998; Freire, 1998). Throughout his work, Freire offers ways to counter the commodification of students and promote true democracy (Marginson, 2006). A Freirean analysis of metaphorical capitals, then, notices the neglect of power relations and the depiction of human relationships as economic exchanges.

Hegemonic cultural values, says Gramsci (2011), are those that are accepted as inevitable. The status quo of the economic system cannot be separated from the status quo of the education system. Gramsci embraces education, believing the development of working class intellectuals will reshape the status quo. Gramsci recognizes resistance and promotes agency, in ways that are echoed by community cultural wealth. Though Gramsci opposes economism, he never claims culture, education, and economics are independent (Jessop & Sum, 2006). These are multiple facets of a single, comprehensive system of power. That is to say, there is no such thing as a non-economic policy goal. Do we choose capital as a metaphor because it is the best metaphor, or because it is the one we are familiar with? A Gramscian analysis by Torres (2013) examines the way a neoliberal framework asserts itself as common sense within educational reforms. In a capitalist system, power is allocated to the financially powerful, structuring our self-definitions. As participants in a capitalist system, capital is our common sense, our default, so it is not a surprise that we append the word even when it is unnecessary. These are “tacit, discursive endorsements of neoliberal ideology” (Ayers, 2005, p. 535). From a social justice perspective, metaphors are not arbitrary tools to assign without consequence. They make claims about truth, using rhetoric that “cannot be neutral” (Derrida & Moore, 1974, p. 41). Discourse matters, whether within controversies over Native American mascots (King & Springwood, 2001) or a politician’s description of a war as a “crusade” (Kellner, 2007). Power relations connect seemingly innocuous discursive practices to broader practices of political rhetoric, discrimination, and global financial institutions (McKenna, 2004). In an analysis of community college mission statements, Ayers (2005) concludes that “neoliberal discourse” directs attention to market concerns, so “curriculum is likely to become heavily laden with a market ideology that reinforces and reproduces power asymmetries” (p. 546). By repeating neoliberal vocabulary, frameworks of metaphorical capital have potentially weakened democracy by re-inscribing a framework of capitalism. Even when a particular study’s content works against oppression, language choices may not.

Although market-based education reforms have become more powerful, those who promulgate theories of metaphorical capital have become less likely to have academic understanding of capital itself (Dika & Singh, 2002). Cultural neglect of students of color cannot be logically separated from the economic exclusion they face, as irrelevant curriculum leads to higher pushout rates (M. Fine, 1991; Solorzano & Yosso, 2001). Yes, the cultures of black, Latina/o, Native ´ American, and Asian American students deserve equal footing inside classrooms, and this is true even—or especially—when those cultural practices are not easily framed as a form of capital. I am inspired by Yosso (2005) in her referral to Anzaldua’s (1990) call for a more empowering ´ theory. Yet I think of Lorde’s (1984) warning, “the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house,” because those tools keep a part of us stuck within “the master’s relationships” (p. 123). Wealth and capital are the capitalist’s tools, the capitalist’s relationships. These are not ethical relationships (Schweickart, 2002). The dominance of financial vocabulary empowers non-human (and inhumane) relationships, through capitalism. These are the relationships between supply and demand; between capital and commodity; between powerful and powerless; between legislation and corporation. As argued by Giroux and Giroux (2006), global capital is responsible for making the wealth and achievement gaps worse for black and Latina/o communities.

I specifically claim that this supposed metaphorical capital is not capital at all. As social justice researchers, we are not neutral; we seek ways to fight oppressive conditions. Yet by basing our metaphors on capital, our theoretical frameworks promote a worldview that is inconsistent with our own goals. Letting go of the metaphor of capital, we may find more relevant and more ethical ways to theorize culture.

### AT: Debate about Debate

#### The disappearance of antitrust law from public discourse has cemented corporate power. A paradigm shift is possible, but requires making monopolies a political issue again, and advocating legal change.

David Dayen 15, author of *Monopolized: Life in the Age of Corporate Power (2020)* and *Chain of Title: How Three Ordinary Americans Uncovered Wall Street's Great Foreclosure Fraud*, “Bring Back Antitrust,” The American Prospect, Vol. 26, No. 4, Fall 2015, lexis.

In 1964, historian Richard Hofstadter gave a speech at the University of California, Berkeley, titled "What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?" He wondered why anti-monopoly sentiment ceased to become the subject of public agitation. "Once the United States had an antitrust movement without antitrust prosecutions," Hofstadter said. "In our time, there have been antitrust prosecutions without an antitrust movement."

Now we have lost both the movement and the prosecutions. When we talk about banks that are too big to fail, we're talking about antitrust. When we talk about the high cost of health care, we're talking about antitrust. So many of our key domestic issues are fundamentally questions about whether we should tolerate monopolies, or dismantle them. But this formulation-a centerpiece of public debate in the last robberbaron era between the 1880s and 1910s-has all but disappeared from popular discourse.

Can anti-monopoly sentiment be revived? When New York's Working Families Party first recruited Zephyr Teachout to run for governor, she said she would only do it if she could talk about monopolies. "They polled it, and they were correct that nobody knew what I was talking about," Teachout says. But when she eventually ran an insurgent campaign against incumbent Andrew Cuomo, she was determined to talk about it anyway.

"The minute you got past the sound-bite level, people responded to the concentration of power," Teachout says. They did campaign events at places where people paid their cable bills, using the pending Comcast-Time Warner merger, eventually abandoned, as the hook. She engaged farmers in upstate New York about monopsony power, and discussed Amazon and big banks on the stump. And it resonated. After only one month of campaigning, Teachout won 35 percent of the vote, with particular strength in upstate counties where farming issues were prominent.

"The Tea Party talks to people and says, 'You're out of power because government is taking it away from you,"' Teachout says. "Far too often, Democrats say, 'You're wrong, you're not out of power.' That's dissonant with our lived experience. You're out of power ... because your priorities don't matter and JPMorgan's do."

Beyond Teachout, you can see through the haze the stirrings of a grassroots antitrust agenda. The greatest anti-monopoly victory of the modern age, the Federal Communications Commission's net-neutrality rules, owed much to a smart, tech-savvy movement that leveraged big protest platforms. Web-native activists fought for the decentralized power of the Internet, without gatekeepers collecting tolls along the way. And they made the connection to things like the Comcast-Time Warner merger, which failed amid public outcry.

"After this existential threat to the Web, you see the same groups becoming interested in the deep history of anti-monopoly laws," Teachout says. "It's kind of an exciting intellectual moment, a fusion between old-school farmers who have been complaining for 30 years and new net-neutrality dreamers."

Monopolists have long used technological advances to consolidate power, from Gilded Age tycoons leveraging control of railroads and telegraphs to Amazon using its first-mover status in e-commerce to squeeze book producers, or Google harvesting traffic to their market-leading search engine to serve ads. It's easy to translate the need for a neutral platform for websites into the same need for book sales or car ride-sharing.

The European Union, in fact, did file formal antitrust charges against Google, accusing it of forcing search engine users into its own shopping platforms, and bundling Android phones with their own apps, to prevent competitors from performing the same functions. The FTC shut down its own investigation into Google over the same concerns in 2013. But an inadvertent disclosure revealed that the agency's Bureau of Competition recommended bringing a lawsuit, arguing that Google's conduct "has resulted-and will result-in real harm to consumers and to innovation in the online search and advertising markets." The political leadership ignored the recommendation.

The next administration must show "leadership that has a certain intellectual curiosity," says Maurice Stucke, pointing to the Google case as a missed opportunity. An alteration in posture would make enforcement far more vigorous, and bringing more cases will give litigators more experience and confidence to negotiate the judicial barriers. The American Antitrust Institute plans to create a transition document for the incoming administration, as they did for the Obama transition.

But at a time of political disempowerment, teaching about the dangers of monopolies and how we have the laws on the books to fight them, and creating upward pressure to do it, offers great potential for a paradigm shift. Connecting Senator Elizabeth Warren's fight against a rigged financial system and Al Franken's fight against media concentration can spark broader political energy.

You could see this potential in Washington, D.C., where in August, the city's Public Service Commission rejected a merger between energy firms Exelon and Pepco, citing "more active participation by parties and interested persons than any other proceeding in the Commission's more than a century of operations." Activists argued a giant Exelon conglomerate would fail to devote resources to the city's clean-energy goals, connecting anti-monopolization with fighting climate change.

There are a lot of reasons for runaway monopolies: an intellectual hijacking by Chicago-school conservative economists, the over-financialization of the economy, a failure of federal antitrust enforcement. But perhaps the biggest reason is that antitrust policy has become divorced from politics, confined to specialized lawyers and mathematicians instead of citizens and activists. Without grassroots momentum, politicians and enforcement agencies can safely ignore the issue. That's the challenge for a small band of academics, think-tank fellows, and activists: to make monopolies a vital issue again, connecting with the severe economic anxiety Americans feel.

#### Debating about policy nuances of addressing war, economic instability, and climate change is important.

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Why did folk politics arise in the first place? Why is it that folk political tendencies, for all their manifest flaws, are so seductive and appealing to the movements of today? At least three answers present themselves. The first explanation is to see folk politics as a response to the problem of how to interpret and act within an ever more complex world. The second, related explanation involves situating folk politics as a reaction to the historical experiences of the communist and social democratic left. Finally, folk politics is a more immediate response to the empty spectacle of contemporary party politics.

Increasingly, multipolar global politics, economic instability, and anthropogenic climate change outpace the narratives we use to structure and make sense of our lives. Each of these is an example of what is termed a complex system, which features nonlinear dynamics, where marginally different inputs can cause dramatically divergent outputs, intricate sets of causes feedback on one another in unexpected ways, and which characteristically operates on scales of space and time that go far beyond any individual’s unaided perception.23 Globalisation, international politics, and climate change: each of these systems shapes our world, but their effects are so extensive and complicated that it is difficult to place our own experience within them. The global economy is a good example of this. In simple terms, the economy is not an object amenable to direct perception; it is distributed across time and space (you will never meet ‘the economy’ in person); it incorporates a wide array of elements, from property laws to biological needs, natural resources to technological infrastructures, market stalls and supercomputers; and it involves an enormous and intricately interacting set of feedback loops, all of which produce emergent effects that are irreducible to its individual components.24 In other words, the interaction of an economy’s parts produces effects that cannot be understood just by knowing how those parts work in isolation – it is only in grasping the relations between them that the economy can be made sense of. While we might have an idea of what an economy consists of, we will never be able to experience it directly in the same way as other phenomena. It can only be observed symptomatically through key statistical indexes (charting changes in inflation or interest rates, stock indexes, GDP, and so on), but can never be seen, heard or touched in its totality.

As a result, despite everything that has been written about capitalism, we still struggle to understand its dynamics and its mechanisms. Most importantly, we lack a ‘cognitive map’ of our socioeconomic system: a mental picture of how individual and collective human action can be situated within the unimaginable vastness of the global economy.25 Recent decades have seen an increasing complexity in the dynamics that impinge upon politics. We might consider the imminent threat of anthropogenic climate change as a new kind of problem – one that is unamenable to any simple solution and that involves such intricately woven effects that it is hard to even know where to intervene. Equally, the global economy today appears significantly more complex in terms of the mobility of capital, the intricacies of global finance and the multiplicity of actors involved. How well do our traditional political images of the world map onto these changes? For the left at least, an analysis premised on the industrial working class was a powerful way to interpret the totality of social and economic relations in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, thereby articulating clear strategic objectives. Yet the history of the global left over the course of the twentieth century attests to the ways in which this analysis failed to attend to both the range of possible liberating struggles (based in gender, race or sexuality) and the ability of capitalism to restructure itself – through the creation of the welfare state, or the neoliberal transformations of the global economy. Today, the old models often falter in the face of new problems; we lose the capacity to understand our position in history and in the world at large.

This separation between everyday experience and the system we live within results in increased alienation: we feel adrift in a world we do not understand. The cultural theorist Fredric Jameson notes that the proliferation of conspiracy theories is partly a response to this situation.26 Conspiracy theories act by narrowing the agency behind our world to a single figure of power (the Bilderberg Group, the Freemasons or some other convenient scapegoat). Despite the extraordinary complexity of some of these theories, they nevertheless provide a reassuringly simple answer to ‘who is behind it all’, and what our own role is in the situation. In other words, they act precisely as a (faulty) cognitive map.

Folk politics presents itself as another possible response to the problems of overwhelming complexity. If we do not understand how the world operates, the folk-political injunction is to reduce complexity down to a human scale. Indeed, folk-political writing is saturated with calls for a return to authenticity, to immediacy, to a world that is ‘transparent’, ‘human-scaled’, ‘tangible’, ‘slow’, ‘harmonious’, ‘simple’, and ‘everyday’.27 Such thinking rejects the complexity of the contemporary world, and thereby rejects the possibility of a truly postcapitalist world. It attempts to give a human face to power; whereas what is truly terrifying is the generally asubjective nature of the system. The faces are interchangeable; the power remains the same. The turn towards localism, temporary moments of resistance, and the intuitive practices of direct action all effectively attempt to condense the problems of global capitalism into concrete figures and moments.

In this process, folk politics often reduces politics to an ethical and individual struggle. There is a tendency sometimes to imagine that we simply need ‘good’ capitalists, or a ‘responsible’ capitalism. At the same time, the imperative to ‘make it local’ leads folk politics to fetishise immediate results and the concrete appearance of action. Delaying a corporate attack on the environment, for instance, is lauded as a success – even if the company simply waits out public attention before returning once again. Moreover, as Rosa Luxemburg pointed out long ago, the fetishisation of ‘immediate results’ leads to an empty pragmatism that struggles to maintain the present balance of power, rather than seeking to change structural conditions.28 Without the necessary abstraction of strategic thought, tactics are ultimately fleeting gestures. Finally, the abjuring of complexity dovetails with the neoliberal case for markets. One of the primary arguments made against planning has been that the economy is simply too complex to be guided.29 The only alternative is therefore to leave the distribution of resources to the market and reject any attempt to guide it rationally.30 Considered in all these ways, folk politics appears as an attempt to make global capitalism small enough to be thinkable – and at the same time, to articulate how to act upon this restricted image of capitalism. By contrast, the argument of this book is that folk-political tendencies are mistaken. If complexity presently outstrips humanity’s capacities to think and control, there are two options: one is to reduce complexity down to a human scale; the other is to expand humanity’s capacities. We endorse the latter position. Any postcapitalist project will necessarily require the creation of new cognitive maps, political narratives, technological interfaces, economic models, and mechanisms of collective control to be able to marshal complex phenomena for the betterment of humanity.

#### Debate’s focus shouldn’t solely be the production of ethical subjectivities. Rather, taking stances on global issues is necessary to develop accountability to global violence.

David Chandler, 2009. Professor of international relations, University of Westminster. “Questioning Global Political Activism,” in *What is Radical Politics Today?* ed. Jonathan Pugh. 81-4.

Today more and more people are ‘doing politics’ in their academic work. This is the reason for the boom in International Relations (IR) study and the attraction of other social sciences to the global sphere. I would argue that the attraction of IR for many people has not been IR theory but the desire to practise global ethics. The boom in the IR discipline has coincided with a rejection of Realist theoretical frameworks of power and interests and the sovereignty/anarchy problematic. However, I would argue that this rejection has not been a product of theoretical engagement with Realism but an ethical act of rejection of Realism's ontological focus.

It seems that our ideas and our theories say much more about us than the world we live in. Normative theorists and Constructivists tend to support the global ethical turn arguing that we should not be as concerned with 'what is' as with the potential for the emergence of a global ethical community. Constructivists, in particular, focus upon the ethical language which political elites espouse rather than the practices of power. But the most dangerous trends in the discipline today are those frameworks which have taken up Critical Theory and argue that focusing on the world as it exists is conservative problem-solving while the task for critical theorists is to focus on emancipatory alternative forms of living or of thinking about the world. Critical thought then becomes a process of wishful thinking rather than one of engagement, with its advocates arguing that we need to focus on clarifying our own [END PAGE 81] ethical frameworks and biases and positionality, before thinking about or teaching on world affairs. This becomes 'me-search' rather than research. We have moved a long way from Hedley Bull's (1995) perspective that, for academic research to be truly radical, we had to put our values to the side to follow where the question or inquiry might lead.

The inward-looking and narcissistic trends in academia, where we are more concerned with our reflectivity- the awareness of our own ethics and values - than with engaging with the world, was brought home to me when I asked my IR students which theoretical frameworks they agreed with most. They mostly replied Critical Theory and Constructivism. This is despite the fact that the students thought that states operated on the basis of power and self-interest in a world of anarchy. Their theoretical preferences were based more on what their choices said about them as ethical individuals, than about how theory might be used to understand and engage with the world.

Conclusion

I have attempted to argue that there is a lot at stake in the radical understanding of engagement in global politics. Politics has become a religious activity, an activity which is no longer socially mediated; it is less and less an activity based on social engagement and the testing of ideas in public debate or in the academy. Doing politics today, whether in radical activism, government policy-making or in academia, seems to bring people into a one-to-one relationship with global issues in the same way religious people have a one-to-one relationship with their God.

Politics is increasingly like religion because when we look for meaning we find it inside ourselves rather than in the external consequences of our 'political' acts. What matters is the conviction or the act in itself: its connection to the global sphere is one that we increasingly tend to provide idealistically. Another way of expressing this limited sense of our subjectivity is in the popularity of globalisation theory - the idea that instrumentality is no longer possible today because the world is such a complex and interconnected place and therefore there is no way of knowing the consequences of our actions. The more we engage in the new politics where there is an unmediated relationship between us as individuals and global issues, the less we engage instrumentally with the outside world, and the less we engage with our peers and colleagues at the level of political or intellectual debate and organisation. [END PAGE 82]

You may be thinking that I have gone some way to describing or identifying what the problems might be but I have not mentioned anything about a solution. I won't dodge the issue. One thing that is clear is that the solution is not purely an intellectual or academic one; the demand for global ethics is generated by our social reality and social experiences. Marx spent some time considering a similar crisis of political subjectivity in 1840s Germany and in his writings - The German Ideology, Introduction to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Theses on Feuerbach, and elsewhere - he raged against the idealism of contemporary thought and argued that the criticism of religion needed to be replaced by the criticism of politics - by political activism and social change based on the emerging proletariat (see Marx, 1975, for example). Nearly two centuries later it is more difficult to see an emerging political subject which can fulfil the task of 'changing the world' rather than merely 'reinterpreting it' through philosophy.

I have two suggestions. Firstly, that there is a pressing need for an intellectual struggle against the idealism of global ethics. The point needs to be emphasised that our freedom to engage in politics, to choose our identities and political campaigns, as well as governments' freedom to choose their ethical campaigns and wars of choice, reflects a lack of socialties and social engagement. There is no global political struggle between 'Empire' and its 'Radical Discontents'; the Foucauldian temptation to see power and resistance everywhere is a product of wishful or lazy thinking dominated by the social categories of the past. The stakes are not in the global stratosphere but much closer to home. Politics appears to have gone global because there is a breakdown of genuine community and the construction of fantasy communities and fantasy connections in global space. Unless we bring politics back down to earth from heaven, our critical, social and intellectual lives will continue to be diminished ones.

Secondly, on the basis that the political freedom of our social atomisation leads us into increasingly idealised approaches to the world we live in, we should take more seriously Hedley Bull's (1995) injunction to pursue the question, or in Alain Badiou's (2004: 237-8) words subordinate ourselves to the 'discipline of the real'. Subordination to the world outside us is a powerful factor that can bind those interested in critical research, whereas the turn away from the world and the focus on our personal values can ultimately only be divisive. To facilitate external engagement and external judgement, I suggest we experiment with ways to build up social bonds with our peers that can limit our freedoms and develop our sense of responsibility and accountability to others. We may have to construct these social connections artificially but their [END PAGE 83] value and instrumentality will have to be proven through our ability to engage with, understand, critique and ultimately overcome the practices and subjectivities of our time.

#### Scenario analysis unlocks an intellectual openness to overcome cognitive biases and incorporate complementary theories while making research policy-relevant

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Added-value of scenario analysis for IR scholarship

As Tomé and Açıkalın (2019) point out, in order to fill the gap between IR theory and real-world problems, “an increasing number of scholars have come to embrace a spirit of intellectual openness, recognizing both the need for greater flexibility in the theoretical formulations and the possibility of complementarity by other theories and approaches” (p. 12). This section discusses the added value of scenario analysis as a complementary approach to traditional IR methods. The most obvious advantage of scenario analysis as a methodology, grounded in the reservoir of foresight studies, lies by definition in its ability to tackle future events. As mentioned before, there are no specified instruments within traditional IR methods which would allow scholars to go beyond past and present. The only exception is forecasting, one of the formal methods in IR, which is, however, distinctly different from foresight.

The underlying logic of forecasting is to provide predictions about the future by drawing on mathematical models and big data-sets based on known patterns. Thus, it is not particularly suitable to accommodate discontinuities. Foresight, as described above, aims at going beyond existing patterns by developing alternative futures based on an innovative combination of multiple driving forces. Its goal is to capture a set of possible futures and learn from them by examining the causal relations between driving forces and their different evolutions. By applying scenario approaches, scholars can thus account for evolving dynamics and discuss such timely issues as the consequences of Brexit for both British and EU-security, economics and politics (Brakman, Garretsen, & Kohl, 2018; Martill & Sus, 2018; Musolff, 2017; Verschueren, 2017; Ziv et al., 2018). Yet, scenario analysis offers more than the possibility to talk about the future. We see a fourfold merit of adding scenario analysis to the range of methods applied by IR scholars.

Confronting enduring assumptions

As we presented in the previous section, the main feature of explorative scenarios, which are the subject of this paper, is to stimulate creative thinking by challenging the deeply held assumptions of their authors. In other words, this method is helpful for overcoming enduring cognitive biases—mental errors such as linearity, presentism, and group think caused by the subconscious and simplified information processing of humans (Heuer, 1999, pp. 111– 112). Humans have the tendencies to focus on the present at the expense of the future and to think about the future in linear terms by extrapolating past trends into the future. As Gaddis (1992) points out, “we tend to bias our historical and our theoretical analyses too much toward continuity (…) we rarely find a way to introduce discontinuities into theory, or to attempt to determine what causes them to happen” (p. 52). Even if Gaddis does not explicitly mention scenarios, he refers to the concepts underlying scenario approaches (Han, 2011, p. 51). Scenario analysis attends to “deeper, otherwise left implicit, assumptions about continuous and linear patterns of development” (Wilkinson et al., 2013, p. 707). The process of scenario development invites the participants to reveal and question convictions which have so far remained unchallenged, and to question the linearity of world developments.

The ability of reexamining one’s own assumptions and going beyond linear patterns of development is essential for IR scholarship. To illustrate it with two examples: IR scholars and historians did not think that the Soviet Union could collapse and were startled by its fall, the peaceful resolution of the Cold War and the transformation of the bipolar system (Davis, 2005; Gaddis, 1992). In a similar vein, United States scholars were for decades so convinced of China’s economic, political, and cultural limitations that they neglected the possibility of its sudden ascent and were taken by surprise when it happened (Hundley, Kenzer, & Peterson, 2015). Interestingly, since the rise of China became evident, the United States debate on its future has been marked by a similar linearity of thought, leading to single-outcome predictions of China’s long-term future (Kerbel, 2004). In both cases, the discipline proved incapable of anticipating events of such importance, because scholars took for granted the status quo instead of confronting their bias towards linearity and detect manifestations of upcoming change. As a result, two major geopolitical surprises—the end of the Cold War and the rise of China have at first been neglected, forcing academia to catch up.

Against this backdrop, foresight helps IR scholars to exit the tunnel vision on world affairs and discover potentially valuable nonlinear lines of development. These can be both innovative in terms of scholarship, and policy-relevant by offering a reflection on unexpected discontinuities. Thus, it can facilitate the intellectual capability to think the unthinkable (Porter, 2016, p. 259).

Bringing forward new research questions

Scenario analysis starts with confronting one’s enduring assumptions and developing multiple causal possibilities, through which scholars can potentially discover topics that have not been examined before. One of the greatest challenges for any scholar is to identify innovative venues for research that might bring the discipline forward and advance publicity for one’s work. In Lakatosian terms, such an ability is often considered an evidence of a progressive research program.10 Since the prime feature of scenario analysis is to detect rapid and significant shifts in trajectories, or the forces behind them, this method succors when defining new pressing topics for academia. In particular, as mentioned in the previous section, scenario analysis enables the detection of both weak signals and wild cards. By drawing attention to these hitherto overlooked but potentially pressing issues, scenario analysis can identify research agendas for further investigation (Barma et al., 2016). Therefore, scenario analysis seems to be the right tool to advance innovative research since it helps scholars drive their research into new areas, away from moribund topics that have been followed for many decades. By “identifying questions of likely future significance” (Barma et al., 2016, p. 6), scenario analysis can contribute to combatting the proliferation of researchers in fields occupying the political status quo, such as Soviet or Japan studies in the United States in the 1980s. At the same time, innovative research topics confront the uncertainties that are crucial for policymakers to be monitored closely.

Dealing with the complexity and interdisciplinarity of real-world issues

Another added value of the scenario analysis for IR scholarship lies in its ability to provide comprehensive causal reasoning and thus to tackle complex issues. As mentioned in the introduction, the world’s complexity combined with abrupt shifts poses a challenge for IR scholarship. The possibility to accommodate multiple driving forces, to take into account different values they might take and finally to combine them with each other and see how they affect the dependent variable, makes the scenario approach quite unique. Traditional IR methods work with a limited number of independent variables, formulate and test hypotheses usually based on the relation between a single causal variable and the dependent variable. Investigating complex causal trajectories is therefore not possible. Against this background, we agree with Barma et al. (2016) and his colleagues who argue that scenarios are highly apt for dealing with complexity and uncertainty and providing academia with a tool for “actionable clarity in understanding contemporary global issues” (p. 1).

Moreover, the scenario approach helps to tackle the challenges of interdisciplinarity that is tied to complexity. By drawing on the active participation of people from different disciplines, backgrounds, and with different expertise in the scenario development process, it brings interdisciplinarity to the table by default. The key advantage of the approach is that this interdisciplinary conversation takes place prior to and during the research phase, rather than after it. This distinguishes the scenario approach from other methods that bring interdisciplinary perspectives together but do not facilitate a discussion between them, rather letting them passively co-exist. By exploring the dynamics between seemingly unrelated vectors of change (key drivers), scenario analysis can be useful for shedding light on developments that would have been overlooked by narrower research designs. In security studies, for example, scenario analysis can connect the dots between hard, soft, traditional and non-traditional understandings of security and capture the interplay of economic-societalenvironmental and technological changes. Imposing interdisciplinarity also helps to counter the “hyper-fragmentation of knowledge” that “makes it difficult for even scholars in different disciplines to understand each other, much less policy-makers and general public” (Desch, 2015, p. 381).

Complex real-world issues that were tackled using scenario analysis include the Israel-Palestine conflict (Stein et al., 1998), Turkey’s geopolitical environment (Çelik & Blum, 2007), the prospects of the United States– China conflict (Friedberg, 2005) and the consequences of Brexit for EU foreign and security policy (Martill & Sus, 2018). An examination of these topics without the application of interdisciplinary approaches would not be possible precisely due to their multifaceted character.

Stepping out of the ivory tower

Finally, scenario analysis also enables IR scholars to establish a channel of communication with policy-makers other than conducting interviews for their own research or providing ad-hoc consultations. A participatory scenario process forges “deep and shared understanding between its participants” (Ramírez & Wilkinson, 2016, p. 21). In scenario workshops, academics and policy-makers work together, confront their world visions and assumptions and arrive at an agreement upon which they develop narratives for alternative futures. Hence, scenario analysis can be perceived as a tool towards more exchange between academia and policy-making that can contribute to a better understanding between the two worlds. For policymakers, it provides the opportunity to consider long-term trends (an occasion not often found in the day-to-day nature of politics). For academics, it provides insight into which trends are most concerning for policy-makers, allowing them to check and ultimately enhance the relevance of their research agendas.

We acknowledge the difficulty to engage policy-makers in foresight exercises caused by their time-constrains and possible lack of interest. Yet, in our experience, this problem mostly refers to high-level policy-makers. Mid-level and former officials and policy-makers have more time and willingness to participate in foresight exercises and contribute equally valuable perspectives. The participatory character of foresight exercises facilitates the exchange of views from different stakeholders on an equal level. In our case, as the evaluation has shown, it has proven to be stimulating for each of the engaged groups.

Moreover, the policy dialogue benefits from scenarios’ accessibility to a broader audience. Scenario publications tend to be shorter and easier to read than the average academic publication and as Nye (2008) rightly notes “a premium on time is a major difference between the two cultures” of academia and policy-making. Since scenario publications are more suitable to the time- and attention-constraints of many policy-makers, they improve the accessibility of research findings for the policy world (Cairney & Kwiatkowski, 2017). An illustrative example is offered by a foresight exercise conducted by the Aspen Institute Berlin in 2017. A group of academics, think tank experts and policy-makers developed scenarios on the future of the liberal world order that served as raw material for a newspaper from the future titled “The Aspen Insight” and dated October 21, 2025. Not only did the presentation of the newspaper catch the attention of many Berlin-based policy-makers but the “The Aspen Insight” was also attached as a supplement to the Berlin daily Tagesspiegel, and reached more than 300,000 readers.11

We acknowledge that the four aspects of the added value of scenario analysis for IR scholarship are interrelated and that their boundaries are not clear-cut. Yet, we believe, they highlight distinct benefits of this approach for academics that want to tackle the challenges of today’s world via their research.

#### Status quo movements must engage one another – viewing problems as separate denies the necessity of solidarity. Claims that the aff’s struggle is most important ignore political realities that require coalitions.

Keeanga-Yamahtta TAYLOR 17, assistant professor in Princeton University's Center for African American Studies [“No Time for Despair,” *Jacobin*, January 28 17, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/01/trump-black-lives-racism-sexism-anti-inauguration/]

There is deep anger and disgust with the political status quo in the United States. The Occupy movement, Black Lives Matter, the heroic pipeline struggles in North Dakota, and the thirteen million people who voted for Bernie Sanders have unearthed that to the world.

When systemic problems become too large to ignore, when socialists start gaining millions of votes, for example, or when black people riot and rebel in the streets, the news media is forced to provide some explanation. And in doing so, they typically give us fractured glimpses of reality. But rarely do they piece together the entire picture. Consider four separate news stories from last year.

The first is the continuing crisis of the opioid addiction crisis in this country. There are two million people addicted to opioids in the United States, a disproportionate number of whom are white. From 2009 to 2014, almost half a million people have died from opioid overdoses, a fourfold increase since 1999.

A second story, briefly in the news, reported on the decline in life expectancy for white women. It is unprecedented for life expectancy to reverse in a so-called first-world country. In the United States peer countries, life expectancy is actually growing. Why is life expectancy for working-class white women in decline? Drug overdose, suicide, and alcohol abuse.

In Chicago, the story has been the rise in shootings and murders in the city’s working-class black neighborhoods. In 2016, there were 4,379 people shot in Chicago, and 797 people killed. The overwhelmingly majority of both were African-American.

The news media’s nonsensical explanations for the violence include retaliation. But that is only matched by the nonsense offered by elected officials, which includes the absence of role models and poor parenting. What is almost never offered as at least part of the answer is how Chicago has the highest black unemployment rate of the nation’s five largest cities at 25 percent, that nearly half of black men aged 20 to 24 are neither in school nor employed, that Chicago has the third-highest poverty rate of large cities in the US, and that it is the most segregated city in the country.

Finally, there is the story of the shrinking of the so-called middle class. In the 1970s, 61 percent of Americans fell into that vague but stable category. Today, that number has fallen to 50 percent. It is driven by the growing wealth inequality that exists in this country.

In the last year alone, the one percent saw their income rise by seven percent, and the .1 percent saw their income rise by 9 percent. In general, the richest 20 percent of US households own 84 percent of the wealth in this country, while the bottom 40 percent own less than one percent.

The media would have us believe that this is a story primarily about the Rust Belt and disgruntled white workers. In fact, it is also a story about 240,000 black homeowners, who lost their houses to foreclosures in the last eight years. It is also a story about urban school closures and the decimation of employment for black educators. Thousands of black teachers have been fired in the last decade.

These four prominent stories reported on over the last several years are often told separately, reinforcing the perception that different groups of ordinary people in this country live in their own world and have experiences that are wholly separate from each other. But what would happen if we put these stories together, and told them as a single narrative about life in this country?

If we told them together, it could allow us to see that the anxieties, stresses, confusions, and frustrations about life world today are not owned by one group, but are shared by many. It would not tell us that everyone suffers the same oppression, but it would allow us to see that even if we don’t experience a particular kind of oppression, every working person in this country is going through something. Everyone is trying to figure out how to survive, and many are failing.

If we put these stories together, we would gain more insight into how ordinary white people have as much stake in the fight for a different kind of society as anyone else.

We wouldn’t so casually dismiss their suffering as privilege, because they do not suffer as much as black and brown people in this country. In fact, we might find that the privileges of white skin run very thin in a country where nineteen million white people languish in poverty.

Apparently, the wages of whiteness are not so great that they can stop millions of ordinary white people from literally drinking and drugging themselves to death, to escape the despair of living in this “greatest country on earth.”

If we put these separate stories into a single story, we could make better sense of why socialism is rising in popularity, why people have taken to the streets over the last six years to protest the growing and racial and economic inequality. There are 400 billionaires in this country. They are the reason why there are forty-seven million poor people. You cannot have untold, obscene wealth unless you have untold, obscene poverty. That is the law of the free market.

And how does this parasitic one percent of the population hold onto their wealth when we are so many? Racism, immigrant bashing, homophobia, transphobia, sexism, nationalism – they get us to fight each other while they hoard their wealth, and they keep our stories separate from each other, so that we never understand the entire story, only our particular part of it.

But knowledge alone of the existence of racism, inequality, poverty, and injustice does not equip with our side with the political tools needed to fight the battles of today or fight for a socialist future. We need struggle, but we also need politics, because we must contend with a political establishment that wants to lower our expectations, to believe that this existing society is the best that we can expect from humanity.

Hillary Clinton ran a campaign of low expectations, a campaign that cynically pivoted around the notion that ordinary people shouldn’t ask for too much. For all the excitement that Bernie Sanders’ campaign generated for rightly demanding more, his commitment to remaining in the Democratic Party then threatens to neuter his political revolution. Expecting the Democratic Party to fight for the democratic redistribution of wealth and resources in this country is like expecting to squeeze orange juice out of an apple. It is impossible.

We must build independent organizations and political parties that are not connected to the Democratic Party, or that rise and fall with each electoral cycle. We have to build organizations that are democratic, multiracial, and militant, with a foundation in solidarity.

“Solidarity” meaning that even if you don’t experience a particular oppression, it doesn’t matter, because you understand that as ordinary people, our fates are tied together, and that one group’s liberation is dependent upon the liberation of all the oppressed and exploited.

Another world is possible. Another United States is possible, but only if we organize and fight for it. In closing, I want to quote from a note that was taped to the front door of my son Ellison’s daycare center on Inauguration Day. It said simply: “Do not despair. Eyes wide open. Strength in numbers. Keep the faith. And stay strong.”

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## AfroPess

#### Debate should be a place of analysis – looking for a solution is already embedded in a grammar of anti-blackness. We stay in the hold of the ship

**Wilderson 14,** An Interview with Frank B. Wilderson, III. “We’re trying to destroy the world” Anti-Blackness & Police Violence After Ferguson

FW: Many years ago, right before George Jackson was murdered, Angela Davis was being interviewed by a journalist, who asked her: 'George Jackson has said that America is a fascist state. Do you agree with that?' And what's important here is the next thing that she said, because this is the moment where we see how the Black psyche is coerced by the hydraulics of terror. She said that, 'if I were to say as Jackson did that America is a fascist State, the only way I can say that is if there were some outside force that was ready to come in and deal with it', and she referenced the Americans and the allies going into Nazi Germany, bombing the hell out of it, and turning it into something other than a fascist state. So what I'm trying to say here, and this is something that happens to all Black people including myself, is that you're faced with this person who wants something coherent from you, so her mind moves from the question, which is a question of pure analysis, 'is this fascism?', and **shifts over to the register of Lenin's question, 'what is to be done?'**

What her unconscious here had done at that moment is to realize that the totality of the fascism we live in is beyond what I can think of as redress. **So let me then corrupt my own analysis, and say that this is not fascism**, so that I can have some kind of speech act about what is to be done. She avoided the question, or **the unconscious made a switch** from pure analysis to 'ooh, let me come up with an answer'. This is what happens to us all the time. **If we can help Black people to stay**, as Saidaya Hartman says, **'in the hold of the ship', that is, to stay in a state of pure analysis, then we can learn more about the totality and the totalizing nature of Black oppression**. And then, move into a conversation about what is to be done, realizing that our language and our concepts (post-colonial, marxist discourse) are so much a part of other peoples' problems, problems that can be solved, that we'll really never get to the thing that solves our problem - because it's already there in Fanon: the end of the world - because at least if we don't have a strategy and tactics for this end of the world, **at least we will not have altered and corrupted our space of pure analysis to make it articulate with some kind of political project**.

#### Our demand is larger in scope – while they wish for contingent riders to be changed, we change the grammar of the all humanism. That means we can solve the case, but they can never solve the critique

**Wilderson 10** Frank B. Wilderson, Red, White, & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms

Black slavery is **foundational to modern** Humanism’s ontics because “**freedom**” is the hub of Humanism’s infinite conceptual trajectories. But these trajectories only appear to be infinite. They are finite in the sense that they are predicated on the idea of freedom from… some contingency that can be named, or at least conceptualized. The contingent rider could be freedom from patriarchy, freedom from economic exploitation, freedom from political tyranny (for example, taxation without representation), freedom from heteronormativity, and so on. What I am suggesting is that first, political discourse recognizes freedom as a structuring ontologic and then it works to disavow this recognition by imagining freedom not through political ontology—where it rightfully began—but through political experience (and practice); whereupon it immediately loses its ontological foundations. Why would anyone do this? Why would anyone start off with, quite literally, an earth-shattering ontologic and, in the process of meditating on it and acting through it, reduce it to an earth reforming experience? Why do Humans take such pride in self-adjustment, in diminishing, rather than intensifying, the project of liberation (how did we get from ’68 to the present)? Because, I contend, in allowing the notion of freedom to attain the ethical purity of its ontological status, one would have to lose one’s Human coordinates and become Black. Which is to say one would have to die.

For the Black, freedom is an ontological, rather than experiential, question. **There is no** philosophically credible **way to attach** **an** **experiential, a contingent, rider onto the notion of freedom when one considers the Black**—such as freedom from gender or economic oppression, the kind of contingent riders rightfully placed on the non-Black when thinking freedom. Rather, the riders that one could place on Black freedom would be hyperbolic—though no less true—and ultimately untenable: i.e., **freedom from the world, freedom from humanity, freedom from everyone (including one’s Black self).**

Given the reigning episteme, what are the chances of elaborating a comprehensive, much less translatable and communicable, political project out of the necessity of freedom as an absolute? Gratuitous freedom has never been a trajectory of Humanist thought, which is why the infinite trajectories of freedom that emanate from Humanism’s hub are anything but infinite—**for they have no line of flight leading to the Slave**.

# 1NR v Harvard Amherst

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#### 3. TVA solves – use personal experience as a justification for topical action – if their argument that form and content can never be separated is true, then all debates are embodied – governmentality is an essential feature of everyone’s lived existence although they experience it different ways.

Kaspar Villadsen and Mitchell Dean, 2012. \*\*Associate Professor, Department of Management, Politics & Philosophy, CBS. \*\*Sociology at Newcastle. “State-Phobia, Civil Society, and a Certain Vitalism.” *Constellations* 19(3): 411-4. Emory Libraries.

However, Rose also makes the claim about the mutation in the relations of power via a different path, where he drifts from second-order to first-order observations. To be sure, Rose generally operates on the second-order level when observing how objects of government are made thinkable and actionable by means of governmental rationalities and technologies.80 Yet, when suggesting a more positive characterization of “our plural present,” he replicates the stories of contemporary cultural theorists and sociologists about cultural differentiation, sub-politics, and aestheticized consumerism.81 While the forms of governing that replace “the social” might be problematic in a number of ways, Rose wishes to emphasize the positive potentials of social experimentation and alternative forms of political agency they now make possible: Within these spaces [of communities], it is possible for subjects to distance themselves from the cohesive discourse and strategies of the social state – schooling, public service resources and techniques of subject formation in order to invent themselves, individually and collectively, as new kinds of political actors.82 At this point, Rose does not remain merely diagnostic; he explicitly affirms a particular kind of self-inventing subject. The shift from detached second-order observation to affirmative firstorder description is complemented by Rose’s invention of what he terms “ethico-politics” (and later, as we shall see, “etho-politics”) to affirm the emergent field of contestation and experimental self-creation opened up by the withering of the social state.83 As a result of this domain of contestation over ethical self-government, Rose asserts that “old forms of political mobilization – the party, the program, the electoral mandate – are losing their attraction.”84 What is missing here is attention to the cost of such a set of claims, that is, of Rose’s own production of knowledge. He would probably agree that concept creation is not about producing valid representations of reality, that it unavoidably constitutes an intervention within a particular discursive terrain. In this sense, conceptual work – even when it rests upon “modest diagnostics” of empirically identifiable minor shifts – is performative in the sense of being a form of action within a discursive and practical context. As such, it is important to consider its possible effects as a form of action. What is at stake in the view that society as a knowable totality gives way to a “postmodern” acceptance of a sociality constituted purely by multiple forms of expertise, networks, or communities? What are the costs for political analysis of the privileging of politics as “active art of living” that opposes all obstacles to the vitalist self-assertion of the will to live through active self-creation?85 First, there are of course political costs of what is conceived as no longer being possible. They center on the difficulties, to say the least, of referring to the kind of knowledge of society or social structure that has been essential for public policy and provision as remedies against social inequality and as a condition of exercising civil, political, and social freedoms. To reject or displace the importance of such a form of knowledge is to put aside or diminish questions concerning the organization of state institutions, the prioritizing of resources, and the securing of minimum and universal standards. Does not a focus on the identifications that form communities or on aestheticized forms of self-creation through “somatic individuality” and an “ethic of vitalism”86 rule out, or at least undermine, this kind of knowledge and these key political questions? As far as the domains of multiple communities are concerned, we may then demand culturally sensitive services and diversified rights rather than uniform provision and universalism. In this respect, the “birth of community” seems to suffer from the same troubling fit with neoliberal strategies for dismantling welfare services and solidifying social segregation as does the postmodern discourse on cultural diversity and societal differentiation.87 There also are analytical costs, as pointed out by sociologists and geographers.88 It is simply very difficult to move between the local, the unique, the contingent, and the relatively unstructured to analyze extra-local contexts, systems, and institutional frameworks or to discern vectors, logics, and pathways that are embedded in larger-scale kinds of power and regulation. Rose and his colleagues are in danger of making a fetish of the localized and the empirical through a methodological commitment to contingency. A set of valid methodological concerns thus risks becoming an untenable ontological commitment to a particular vision of social and political life as unstructured flux and fluidity.89 As it stands, Rose’s ethico-politics is a politics of self-creation that abjures social policy and appears once the social state has been displaced. It is striking, however, that Rose comes very close, as do post-Foucauldians such as William Connolly,90 to a positive conception of civil society. Thus, Rose’s concept of politics seems to share the same space as civil society, i.e., it is an extra-state space of innovation, creativity, and critical contestation of state-centered politics and administration. While Rose may share with critical theorists and others a celebration of this realm and its self-creating agents, he brackets the long-lasting, central concern of this tradition to define the conditions of a thriving civil society, including what kind of an active sovereign state power needs to be in place for the potentially lethal conflicts of civil society to be kept in check. By adhering principally to a conception of power as productive and relational, Rose avoids these thorny issues and appears to leave us a fluid and experimental form of post-social politics. In short, there are elements of state-phobia in Rose and a related vitalism in the conclusion of his work on governmentality. These aspects become even more pronounced in his recent work on the multifarious contemporary dimensions of biopolitics from genetics to selfhealth practices and aesthetic interventions on the body.91 Here, Rose argues that the days of state-administered biopolitics, exemplified by the eugenic drive for biological and moral perfection, are over, and that they have been succeeded by alliances between self-creating consumers and pharmaceutical companies and biomedicine offering products and services for voluntary bodily improvements and risk minimization. Rose is at pains to avoid a purely negative view of this novel somatic ethics and recognizes the expanded possibilities for autonomy and self-formation offered by biotechnology, which “enables us to intervene upon ourselves in new ways.”92 The passage from “the social state” to “advanced liberalism” thus holds the promise of more diversified experimentation and contestation of truth claims about biological normality: “Our somatic individuality has become opened up to choice, prudence, and responsibility, to experimentation, to contestation – and so to a ‘vital politics’.”93 The phrase “art of living” is thus given a more substantive anchorage in the very materiality of the body (“somatic individuality”), and the concept of ethico-politics has been transmuted into etho-politics: By ethopolitics I mean to characterize ways in which the ethos of human existence . . . have come to provide the “medium” within which the self-government of the autonomous individual can be connected up with the imperatives of good government. . . . While ethopolitical concerns range from those of lifestyle to those of community, they coalesce around a kind of vitalism . . . in this highly contested domain, somatic individuals are the key actors.94 None of this escapes Rose’s earlier dilemmas. If anything, the aporiae of state-phobia become more acute. If we follow Rose and raise “life itself” to a quasi-universal contemporary political agency, then it is difficult to understand how active choices of self-creation can be available to all without raising the question of the role of the state in ensuring universal access to basic health, promoting innovations in biomedicine, surgery, and the pharmaceutical industries, and securing a set of standards so that life can be lived in this self-governing way. Otherwise etho-politics becomes the preserve of a privileged caste or, at best, unevenly distributed, which then gets played out in the appropriation and allocation struggles that have been at the core of the territorial state’s quest for civil peace and the welfare state’s concern for universal social rights. It is noteworthy, perhaps, that Rose’s ethico-politics breaks with Foucault with respect to the latter’s indebtedness to Kant. The dictum that “each person’s life should be its own telos” seems opposed to the Kantian idea of a responsible agent who needs to take aim at a particular present, a particular cultural situation and collectivity. In Rose’s politics, the ethical instance is not located within this kind of a mature attitude, but rather within a set of interrelations with human, non-human, and post-human forces. It seems to be at these intersections that Rose sees the emergence of a new type of ethical subjectivity as a kind of active self-creation in relation to the plasticity of life and corporeality. But how new is this proposal, given the long standing sociological assertions of “life as a planning project” and of vital self-creation of identity in late modernity?95 Along with the demise of the social state, this leaves us with a stance approaching “negative freedom” opposed to “all that which blocks or subverts the capacity of others asserting for themselves their own vitalism.”96 To summarize, we can identify four key aspects of Rose’s ethical subjectivity. First, it is located outside or at the fringes of the “social state” and is shaped by personal identifications with diverse communities. Secondly, it breaks free from or contests the conventional “welfarist” institutions and their authorized forms of knowledge. Thirdly, it is “free from” political impetus, and finally, it is particularly intense and innovative in the experimental practices of self-creation where human and non-human forces intersect.